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A Note On Orthogonal Decomposition of Finite Games
Changxi Li1, Daizhan Cheng2, Fenghua He1,
Abstract—Various decomposition of finite games have been
proposed. The inner product of vectors plays a key role in the
decomposition of finite games. This paper considers the effect
of different inner products on the orthogonal decomposition of
finite games. We find that only when the compatible condition is
satisfied, a common decomposition can be induced by the stan-
dard inner product and the weighted inner product. To explain
the result, we studied the existing decompositions, including
potential based decomposition, zero-sum based decomposition,
and symmetry based decomposition.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the widespread applications of game theory, many
researchers begin studying the topological structure of finite
games. Decomposition of finite games is the main technique
[1]-[4].
Different decompositions are proposed from different
point of views. i) Using Helmholtz decomposition theorem,
[3] proposed a potential based decomposition of finite games,
where the space of finite games G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is decomposed
into a canonical sum of the pure potential subspace P , the
non-strategic subspace N , and the pure harmonic subspace
H,
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] = ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Potential games
P ⊕
Harmonic games︷ ︸︸ ︷
N ⊕ H .
ii) [6] reinvestigated the potential based decomposition on
Euclidean space, and bases of all subspaces in the decompo-
sition are provided. iii) [7] proposed three kinds of decom-
positions of finite games: zero-sum based decomposition
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] = Z ⊕ C,
normalization based decomposition
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] = L ⊕ E ,
and zero-sum equivalent potential based decomposition
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] = (L ∩ C) ⊕ B ⊕ (L ∩ Z),
where Z, C,L, E and B = (Z+E)∩(C+E) are the subspace
of zero-sum games, common interest games, normalized
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games, non-strategic games, and zero-sum equivalent poten-
tial games, respectively. iv) Symmetry based decomposition
of finite games are proposed in [8], [9], which is shown as
follows
G[n;l,··· ,l] = S ⊕ K,
where S is the subspace of the symmetry games and K is
the orthogonal complement of S.
As far as we know, different technical tools are used
for various decompositions. For example, the technical tools
used in [3] and [6] are Helmholtz decomposition theorem and
semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices respectively, where
different inner products for the space of games are defined.
But surprisingly, [3] and [6] have provided the same decom-
position (potential based decomposition) independently.Why
can different inner products induce the same decomposition?
Contingency or necessity? If it is a contingency, then under
what conditions will the decomposition be the same using
Helmholtz decomposition theorem and STP? This note aims
at answering all the questions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
provides some preliminaries including finite games theory,
matrix expression of finite games. Section 3 investigates the
effect of different inner products on the orthogonal decom-
position of finite games. Section 4 is a brief conclusion. For
statement ease, we give some notations:
1) Mm×n: the set of m× n real matrices.
2) D := {0, 1}.
3) δin: the i-th column of the identity matrix In.
4) ∆n :=
{
δin|i = 1, · · · , n
}
.
5) 1ℓ = (1, 1, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ℓ
)T .
6) 0p×q: a p× q matrix with zero entries.
7) A matrix L ∈ Mm×n is called a logical matrix if
the columns of L are of the form of δkm. That is,
Col(L) ⊂ ∆m. Denote by Lm×n the set of m × n
logical matrixes.
8) If L ∈ Ln×r, by definition it can be expressed as L =
[δi1n , δ
i2
n , · · · , δ
ir
n ]. For the sake of compactness, it is
briefly denoted as L = δn[i1, i2, · · · , ir].
9) Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n}. Sn is the set of permutations
of elements of N .
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section gives a very brief review on semi-tensor
product of matrices and game theory. Plese refer to [5], [11]
for more details.
A. Finite Games
Definition 2.1: A finite non-cooperative game G =
{N,S, c} is a triple, where
(a) N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of players;
(b) S =
∏n
i=1 Si is the strategy profile of the game, with
Si = {1, 2, · · · , ki} as the set of strategies of player
i ∈ N ;
(c) c = {c1, . . . , cn} is the set of payoff functions, where
ci : S → R is the payoff function of player i ∈ N .
Denote by G[n;k1,··· ,kn] the set of finite games with |N | =
n and |Si| = ki, ∀i =∈ N . There are many classes of games.
The following are the definitions of some special games used
in this note.
• Zero-sum games: a finite non-cooperative game G ∈
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is a zero-sum game, if and only if,
n∑
i=1
ci(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ S.
• Common interest games: a finite non-cooperative game
G ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is a common interest game, if and
only if,
ci(s) = cj(s), ∀s ∈ S, ∀i, j ∈ N.
• Normalized games: a finite non-cooperative game G ∈
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is a normalized game, if and only if,∑
xi∈Si
ci(xi, s−i) = 0, ∀s−i ∈ S−i, ∀i ∈ N,
where S−i =
∏n
j=1,j 6=i Sj .
• Potential games: a finite non-cooperative game G ∈
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is potential if and only if there is a function
P (s), called the potential function, such that
ci(xi, s−i)− ci(yi, s−i) = P (xi, s−i)− P (yi, s−i)
∀xi, yi ∈ Si, ∀s−i ∈ S−i, i = 1, · · · , n.
• Harmonic games: a finite non-cooperative game G ∈
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is a harmonic game, if and only if, it is a
zero-sum game and a normalized game, i.e.,
n∑
i=1
ci(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ S,
∑
xi∈Si
ci(xi, s−i) = 0, ∀s−i ∈ S−i, ∀i ∈ N.
• Non-strategic games: a finite non-cooperative gameG ∈
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is a non-strategic game, if and only if, for
any i ∈ N that
ci(xi, s
−i)− ci(yi, s
−i) = 0, ∀xi, yi ∈ Si, ∀s
−i ∈ S−i.
• Symmetry games: a finite non-cooperative game G ∈
G[n;l,··· ,l] is a symmetry game, if and only if, for any
σ ∈ Sn
ci(s1, · · · , sn) = cσ(i)(sσ−1(1), sσ−1(2), · · · , sσ−1(n)),
si ∈ Si, i = 1, · · · , n.
B. Matrix Expression of Finite Games
The tool used in this paper is the semi-tensor product
(STP) of matrices [11], which is a generalization of con-
ventional matrix product.
Definition 2.2: Let A ∈Mm×n and B ∈Mp×q and t =
lcm(n, p) be the least common multiple of n and p. The
semi-tensor product (STP) of A and B is defined as
A⋉B :=
(
A⊗ It/n
) (
B ⊗ It/p
)
∈ Mmt/n×qt/p.
Identify j ∼ δjki , which is called the vector expression to
strategies j ∈ Si. Using STP and the vector expression to
strategies si ∈ Si, i = 1, · · · , n, the strategy profile s =∏n
i=1 si can be expressed as
s = ⋉ni=1si.
Under this expression, each payoff function ci becomes a
mapping ci : ∆k → R, where k =
∏n
i=1 ki. Hence for each
ci we can find a unique row vector Vi ∈ Rk such that
ci(s1, · · · , sn) = Vix, i = 1, · · · , n.
Vi is called the structure vector of ci(x). A finite game G ∈
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is uniquely determined by {Vi|i = 1, · · · , n}.
Denote the payoff vector by VG := [V1, · · · , Vn] ∈ Rnk.
Then it is clear that G[n;k1,··· ,kn] has a natural vector space
structure as Rnk.
To illustrate the vector expression of finite games, we
provide the following example.
Example 2.3: Consider a three-player game G. Each
player has two strategies Si = {1, 2}, i = 1, 2, 3, and the
payoffs of G are described as in Table I.
TABLE I
PAYOFF MATRIX OF EXAMPLE 2.3
Vi\s 111 112 121 122 211 212 221 222
V1 26 9 12 4 14 6 14 6
V2 −5 −5 2 2 2 2 4 4
V3 18 10 4 5 7 8 7 8
The payoff vector of G is
VG = [V1, V2, V3]
= [26, 9, 12, , 4, 14, 6, 14, 6,−5,−5, 2, 2, 2, 2,
4, 4, 18, 10, 4, 5, 7, 8, 7, 8].
III. INNER PRODUCT AND ORTHOGONAL
DECOMPOSITION
Consider any two vectors X and Y in the vector space
R
nk. The standard inner product on Euclidean space is
〈X,Y 〉 = XTY.
For positive definite matrix Q ∈ Mnk×nk, the weighted
inner product is defined as follows
〈X,Y 〉Q := X
TQY,
where Q ∈Mnk×nk is called the weight matrix of the inner
product 〈·, ·〉Q.
Different decompositions employ different inner products.
The inner product in [3] is the weighted inner product with
the weight matrix
Q = diag

k1, · · · , k1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, k2, · · · , k2︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, · · · , kn, · · · , kn︸ ︷︷ ︸
k

 . (1)
And the inner product used in [6] and [7] is the standard
inner product on Euclidean space. We will investigate under
what conditions the two inner products can induce the same
decomposition.
Consider a decomposition of finite games, which has the
following form
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] =M1 ⊕ M2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Mp, (2)
where Mi is the subspace of finite games, i = 1, . . . , p.
Definition 3.1: (Compatible Condition) Consider the de-
composition of finite games (2). The standard inner product
and the weighted inner product with Q as its weight matrix
are called compatible, if for any game G ∈Mij with VG as
its payoff vector, the games determined by VGQ and VGQ
−1
also belong to Mij , j = 1, · · · , p− 1.
Theorem 3.2: A common decomposition (2) can be in-
duced by the standard inner product and a weighted inner
product simultaneously, if and only if the compatible condi-
tion is satisfied.
Proof: Suppose the decomposition (2) is induced by the
standard inner product. Then for any G1 ∈ Mi1 and G2 ∈
Mi2 we have,
〈V i1G , V
i2
G 〉
= V i1G (V
i2
G )
T
= 0, ∀i1, i2.
(3)
Consider a weighted inner product with Q as its weight
matrix, we have
〈V i1G , V
i2
G 〉Q
= V i1G Q(V
i2
G )
T
= Vˆ i1G (V
i2
G )
T
= 〈Vˆ i1G , (V
i2
G )
T 〉
= 0, ∀i1, i2,
(4)
where Vˆ i1G = V
i1
G Q. The first equality follows from the
definition of weighted inner product, the second equality
follows from the compatible condition, and the third equality
follows from condition (3). Condition (4) implies that the
decomposition (2) is induced by the weighted inner product.
If the decomposition (2) is induced by the weighted inner
product. Then for any G1 ∈ Mi1 and G2 ∈Mi2 we have,
〈V i1G , V
i2
G 〉Q
= V i1G Q(V
i2
G )
T
= 0, ∀i1, i2.
(5)
Consider the standard inner product, we have
〈V i1G , V
i2
G 〉
= V i1G (V
i2
G )
T
= (V i1G Q
−1)Q(V i2G )
T
= 〈V i1G Q
−1, V i2G 〉Q
= 0, ∀i1, i2.
(6)
The first equality follows from the definition of standard
inner product, the second and the third equality follows from
the compatible condition, and the fourth equality follows
from condition (5). Condition (6) implies that the decom-
position (2) is induced by the standard inner product.
✷
Example 3.3: 1) Consider the potential based decom-
position of finite games
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] = P ⊕ N ⊕ H.
According to [6] and [3], the potential based de-
composition was obtained using the standard inner
product and weighted inner product (1), respectively.
The reason can be explained as follows. For any
potential game G = {N,S, {ci}i∈N}, the game Gˆ is
a weighted potential game, where Gˆ is determined by
the payoff vector VGQ (or VGQ
−1). Similarly, it is
easy to verify that any non-strategic game G, the game
VGQ (or VGQ
−1) is also non-strategic. Therefore the
compatible condition is satisfied.
2) Consider the zero-sum based decomposition
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] = Z ⊕ C.
Let VG ∈ Z and V˜G ∈ C be arbitrary. Then
〈VG, V˜G〉
=
∑
s∈S
∑n
i=1 Vi(s)V˜i(s)
=
∑
s∈S V˜1(s)
∑n
i=1 Vi(s)
= 0,
which implies that the zero-sum based decomposition
can be induced by the standard inner product. But for
weighted inner product (1)
〈VG, V˜G〉Q =
∑
s∈S
∑n
i=1 kiVi(s)V˜i(s). (7)
According to (7), 〈VG, V˜G〉Q = 0, if and only
if all players have the same strategies, i.e. ki =
constant, ∀i. Therefore the zero-sum based decompo-
sition does not hold for general case. The reason is that
the compatible condition is not satisfied for zero-sum
based decomposition.
3) Using the compatible condition, one can verify that
the symmetry based decomposition and normalization
based decomposition are the same under the standard
inner product and the weighted inner product (1).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper considers the effect of different inner products
on the orthogonal decomposition of finite games. We find that
only when the compatible condition is satisfied, a common
decomposition can be induced by the standard inner product
and the weighted inner product simultaneously. To explain
the result, we studied the existing decompositions, including
potential based decomposition, zero-sum based decomposi-
tion, and symmetry based decomposition.
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